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I. — INTRODUCTION
The future role of long-term contracts (LTCs) in the global energy sector is
a major topic in recent policy debates. The discussion is fostered by the
ongoing liberalization process in Continental Europe’s natural gas and electri-
city markets in a period when import countries have encountered record-high
prices, e.g., crude oil has been traded in the US$ 140/bbl range in summer
2008 and LNG spot cargoes delivered to Japan were above US$ 19/MBTU in
January 2008.
The dynamic factors affecting the global market for natural gas include :
increasing competition for world reserves in a seller’s market, realization of
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large-scale infrastructure investments (LNG as well as pipelines), new market
entrants (countries as well as companies), and changes in trade structures. In
the last five to ten years the global LNG industry has undergone rapid matu-
ration. Changes in the institutional framework of downstream markets have
moved the industry from monopolistic structures towards competition, thus
stimulating fundamental changes in the organizational behavior of market par-
ticipants. On the one hand we can observe vertical integration and strategic
partnerships becoming commonplace, e.g., ExxonMobil in cooperation with
Qatar Petroleum controlling the entire value chain for LNG deliveries from
Qatar to the UK, and on the other hand we can observe the increasing impor-
tance of LNG spot trade with natural gas hubs gaining in liquidity (2).
In the view of institutional economics, LTCs are considered a hybrid form of
governance on the continuum between spot markets and full vertical integra-
tion. Typically, private oil and gas majors which participate in upstream pro-
jects or a consortium of the national oil/gas company and a private partner
represent the transactor contracting for deliveries to downstream markets.
LTCs have also experienced changes, such as decreased contract duration,
diminished reliance on oil-price indexation in favor of gas-to-gas competition,
and the relaxation or elimination of inflexible clauses, e.g., take-or-pay or des-
tination obligations. This paper analyses the determinants of contract duration
in order to investigate the impact of market structure (i.e., the level of compe-
tition on a regional as well as global level) on optimal governance choice.
Transaction cost economics, assuming bounded rationality of economic
actors as well as asymmetric information, argues that LTCs are a tool to mini-
mize transaction costs in bilateral relationships where relationship-specific
investments occur with complex contracts functioning to overcome the ex post
hold-up problem without integrating vertically (Williamson, 1975, 1985 ;
Klein et al., 1978). Empirical literature offers broad support for the proposi-
tion that economic actors choose organizational form and contract terms that
promote efficient adaptation and minimize transaction costs. Masten (1999)
provides a summary of studies investigating the determinants of contract dura-
tion and contract design. Pirrong’s (1993) analysis on contracting practices in
bulk shipping markets investigates differences in exogenous factors such as
market structure or vessel specialization to explain the diversity of existing
forms of governance. Whereas spot contracts are chosen in the absence of any
bilateral dependency relationship, forward contracts are employed when signi-
ficant temporal specificity is observed. In a specialized shipping market where
both temporal and contractual specificities are present, LTCs or vertical inte-
(2) Whereas the share of short-term trade already has doubled from 10 % in 2000 to 20 % in
2008, a further increase to about 30 % is expected for the coming decade (IEA, 2008).
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gration have proven to be the transaction cost economizing organizational
structures.
Several empirical studies, most of which are based on a transaction cost fra-
mework, investigate the interrelation between contract duration and environ-
mental characteristics. Empirical work on LTCs in the energy sector started
during the 1980s. Joskow’s path-breaking work (1985, 1987) investigating the
relationship between specific investments and contract duration in the US coal
industry shows that contracting parties make longer commitments when site-
specific, physical asset-specific or dedicated investments occur. Saussier
(1999) provides a first empirical study using European data on coal procure-
ment accounting for the endogeneity of specific investments. He confirms that
contract duration reflects the desire to save transaction costs ; duration
increases with the level of appropriable quasi rents at stake in the transaction,
and decreases with the level of uncertainty. Investigating coal contracts,
Kerkvliet and Shogren (2001) find a positive relationship between physically
specific investments and contract duration and show that the duration
decreases with rising trading and market experience. Saussier (2000) adds a
new dimension via testing the influence of transaction parameters on the level
of completeness of French coal supply contracts, accounting for endogeneity
of asset specificity. He shows that the completeness of contracts increases with
the level of specific investments and decreases with the level of uncertainty.
A number of studies investigating the natural gas sector discuss contractual
relations in different institutional settings. Hubbard and Weiner (1986) analy-
ze long-term natural gas supply contracts between producers and pipelines fol-
lowing the deregulation of wellhead prices in the US and derive a theoretical
model on the determination of take-or-pay provisions. Crocker and Masten
(1988) discuss and test the impact of regulatory actions on contract duration to
show that distortions in performance incentives raise the hazards of long-term
agreements and therefore shorten contract duration. Neuhoff and Hirschhausen
(2005) discuss the role of long-term natural gas contracts in markets under-
going liberalization. They show that both strategic producers and consumers
benefit from lower prices and a higher market volume if long-run demand
elasticity is significantly higher than short-run elasticity. Hirschhausen and
Neumann (2008) provide an empirical analysis of the changing contract struc-
ture in international natural gas trading. They find that contract duration
decreases as market structure evolves to more competitive regimes and provi-
de further empirical support for transaction cost economics by showing that
investments linked to specific infrastructures increase contract duration by an
average of three years.
Whereas the early literature focusing on the natural gas sector is based on the
US market, Hirschhausen and Neumann (2008) provide the first study using
international trade data. Our contribution to the literature is the first empirical
assessment focusing on long-term liquefied natural gas supply contracts. In
contrast to traditional pipeline infrastructures there is no locational specificity
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of investments resulting from technical characteristics since trades between
varying players theoretically are feasible. The market structure has changed
dramatically during the past decade ; the survival of incumbents as well as new
entrants strongly depends on their ability to act economically ; strategic deci-
sions (of private sector players) are driven by cost minimization. The hetero-
geneity of transactions in terms of varying levels of relationship-specific
investments and external uncertainty should be matched by diversity in forms
of governance (varying levels of vertical integration ; varying characteristics
and duration of supply contracts, etc.).
For these reasons, our data are particularly well-suited to test transaction cost
theory’s propositions. We discuss the determination of the optimal contract
length as a trade-off between the minimization of transaction costs due to
repeated bilateral bargaining and the risk of being bound by an inflexible
agreement in uncertain environments. Furthermore, we add to the theoretical
discussion an analysis of different dimensions of transaction frequency and
their impact on governance choice.
Building a two-stage estimation model to account for endogeneity of the
contracted volume, we empirically test propositions i) on the above mentioned
trade-off with LTCs securing durable investments but forgoing some flexibili-
ty, and ii) on the influence of transaction frequency (within the relationship as
well as between the trading partners) on contract duration. Estimation results
using a unique dataset including information of LNG supply contracts from
the beginning of the industry until today show that the presence of high, dedi-
cated asset specificity in LNG contracts results in longer contracts, confirming
the predictions of transaction cost economics. The need for flexibility in
today’s « second generation » LNG market supports shorter-term agreements.
Contract duration decreases when firms have experience in bilateral trading. In
addition, we find that countries heavily reliant on natural gas imports via LNG
are often willing to forgo some flexibility in favor of supply security. Contracts
dedicated to competitive downstream markets on average are shorter than
those concluded with customers in non-liberalized import markets.
The paper is organized as follows : Section II discusses the theoretical back-
ground and derives testable hypotheses and Section III introduces the indus-
try-specific context. Section IV summarizes the dataset and introduces the
methodology. We present and interpret estimation results in Section V before
concluding in Section VI.
II. — THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
II.1. Optimal contract duration – a trade-off
The trade-off between contracting costs and flexibility is discussed in theo-
ry and investigated in a number of empirical papers (e.g., Gray, 1978 ; Crocker
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and Masten, 1988 ; Klein, 1989 ; Klein et al., 1990 ; Heide and John, 1990).
Transaction cost economics predicts that investments in idiosyncratic assets
result in ex post bilateral dependency and lead to a lock-in situation where the
investor faces the hazard of post-contractual opportunism and strategic bar-
gaining by the counterparty. In such settings longer-term agreements attenua-
te those costs by stipulating the terms of trade over the life of the contract. Yet
contract duration is limited due to uncertainty about the future and the hazard
of being bound by an agreement that may no longer reflect market realities ;
obviously, spelling out every contingency is costly or even impossible. Hence,
the trade-off lies in choosing « terms that maintain incentives for efficient
adaptation while minimizing the need for costly adjudication and enforce-
ment » (Crocker and Masten, 1988, p. 328).
The optimal level of contract duration τ * corresponds to a situation where
the marginal costs and benefits of contracting are equal. The costs of being
bound by the contract are determined mainly by the level of uncertainty and
will increase with duration. Uncertainty about the future is higher for more dis-
tant time horizons ; parameters that are fixed in the short-term become variable
in the long-term. Hence, stipulated terms may be inefficient in later periods
and marginal costs increase with uncertainty and contract duration. We note
that the presence of uncertainty also raises the costs of bargaining ; however,
the costs of contracting increase to a greater extent since the parties must
account for all (known) possible contingencies.
The benefits of avoiding repeated negotiation are chiefly determined by the
level of idiosyncratic investments dedicated to the trading relationship.
Longer-term agreements support the willingness of the party to take actions
whose values are conditional upon the counterparty’s post-contractual beha-
vior ; the costs of repeated bargaining are eliminated. Marginal benefits
decrease with contract duration. Figure 1 illustrates the optimization problem.
An increase in the level of uncertainty (u’’ > u) will result in an upward shift
of the marginal cost curve ; an increase in the level of asset specificity (s’ > s)
will result in an upward shift of the marginal benefits curve, and both move the
optimal level of contract duration.
We can formalize the discussion above by the optimization problem:
max
τ
G(τ ) with G(τ ) = B(τ ) – C(τ ) with G being the net gains in transaction
costs which equal the difference between the benefits of contracting B and the
costs of contracting C (both, ex ante as well as ex post). The first order condi-
tion yields :
G′(τ ) = MB(τ ) – MC(τ ) = 0
MB(τ *) = MC(τ *) (1)
with optimal contract duration determined by the setting where marginal bene-
fits equal marginal costs. Since it is difficult to observe and measure contrac-
ting costs, we construct a reduced form model where the marginal cost and
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marginal benefits of contracting are related to observable contracting attri-
butes :
MB(τ *) = MB(τ ,s,ν) = α 0 – α 1τ + α 2s + ν
MC(τ *) = MC(τ ,u,ω) = β 0 + β 1τ + β 2u + ω (2)
with τ being the length of the agreement, s the level of specific assets dedica-
ted to the trading relationship, u the level of uncertainty and ν and ω further
explaining attributes such as unobserved heterogeneity between the parties, or
environmental characteristics. Substituting (2) into (1) and rearranging yields
the reduced form:
τ * = γ 0 + γ 1s – γ 2u + ε (3)
α 0 – β 0 α 2 β 2 ν – ω
with γ 0 = ——— , γ 1 = ——— , γ 2 = ——— , ε = ———
β 1 – α 1 β 1 – α 1                 β 1 – α 1             β 1 – α 1
with optimal contract duration on the left hand side of the equation and
contracting attributes on the right. From the discussion above we derive the
following propositions : 
Proposition 1a : Contract duration should increase with the level of invest-
ments in idiosyncratic assets to avoid repeated bilateral bargaining and miti-
gate the ex post hold-up problem between the contracting parties.
Proposition 1b : Higher environmental uncertainty should reduce contract
duration to minimize the risk of being bound by a long-term commitment that
no longer reflects market realities.
II.2. Hypotheses on the impact of transaction frequency
Transaction cost theory argues that transaction costs increase with the fre-
quency of the transaction within the trading relationship due to the repeated
hazard of opportunistic behavior and potential strategic renegotiation, which
increases the incentive to organize the transaction under stronger internal
control. Thereby, the contracting parties anticipate ex ante the total number of
future transactions and decide on contract design, taking into account tran-
saction frequency. An alternative explanation for a high frequency resulting
in more firm-like governance structures is the greater potential for internal
specialization and for exploiting scale economies (see e.g., Williamson,
1985).
However, another perspective looks at the number of settlements in which
similar transactions by the same parties occur. First, faithful partners may be
rewarded and opportunistic behaviors punished in such long-term relation-
ships. Second, there may be a decrease in transaction costs due to learning pro-
cesses, established routines, and reputational effects (see e.g., Milgrom and
REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE — n°127, 3ème trimestre 2009 95
Roberts, 1992), all of which reduce the need for formal mechanisms to enfor-
ce bilateral agreements. See Gulati and Nickerson (2008) for a deeper discus-
sion on the impact of inter-organizational trust on governance choice and firm
performance. A high transaction frequency therefore should result in shorter
contracts. Garvey (1995) develops a model investigating the effect of reputa-
tion on governance choice in settings where non-contractible investments
occur. He finds that integration is favored for one-shot games whereas more
hybrid structures like joint ventures are preferred in repeated games. He argues
further that reputational considerations have an effect on both the parties’ sur-
plus and the optimal choice of asset ownership.
We argue that these two perspectives on transaction frequency are comple-
mentary and expand the above developed model (3) including two frequency
measures : fw indicating the frequency of the transaction within the relation-
ship and fb indicating the historical frequency of transactions between the
same trading partners expecting a positive (respectively negative) relationship
with contract duration :
τ * = γ 0 + γ 1s – γ 2u + γ 3 fw – γ 4 fb + ε (4)
With increasing « within frequency » the costs of contracting will rise due to
the repeated hazard of opportunistic bargaining ; with increasing « between
frequency » the costs of contracting will fall due to lower ex ante as well as ex
post transaction costs (see also Figure 1). We therefore derive the following
propositions :
Proposition 2a : Contract duration should increase with the level of frequen-
cy of the transactions within the trading relationship to avoid the repeated
hazard of post-contractual opportunism by the non-investing party.
FIGURE 1 : Optimization problem – (1) original form and
(2) including transaction frequency
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Proposition 2b : Contract duration should decrease with the frequency of tran-
sactions between the same trading partners due to learning and reputational
effects.
III. — INDUSTRY CONTEXT
During the 1980s and early 1990s, indigenous natural gas supplies and
imports via pipeline were sufficient to meet demand in the Atlantic Basin, and
LNG capacities grew relatively slowly. In contrast, Pacific Basin importers
(mainly Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) lacking large domestic energy sup-
plies and pipeline sources historically relied upon LNG imports. Figure 2
depicts the three stages of the LNG value chain : upstream exploration, pro-
duction and liquefaction, midstream transportation (i.e., shipping) and downs-
tream regasification, storage and marketing.
Converting natural gas to LNG for transportation by tanker has been utilized
for more than 40 years, but the industry achieved a remarkable level of global
trade only recently. As early as 1964, the technology of natural gas liquefac-
tion enabled commercial transport in tankers, but transport remained expensi-
ve and markets stayed regional in nature until the 1990s. During this early
stage, most of the world’s LNG export infrastructure remained under state
control and private or foreign companies were rarely involved. Inflexible bila-
teral long-term contracts with take-or-pay and destination clauses secured
infrastructure investments and reliable supplies for import-dependent buyers.
Since the 1990s, investments in LNG infrastructure grew rapidly as world-
wide natural gas demand increased, leading to substantial economies of scale
throughout the value chain ; tanker financing and construction schedules bene-
fited from new manufacturing techniques. Today’s large ships reduce average
transport costs ; break-even of pipeline and LNG transport is achieved at about
3,000 km (Jensen 2004). Investment costs for the entire value chain can be up
to US$ 5 billion with upstream exploration and production accounting for the
largest share (about 55 %). Today, LNG supplies the US, the UK, Spain, South
FIGURE 2 : LNG value added chain
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Korea, India, and China among others. Importers compete for supplies in a sel-
ler’s market. The Middle East accounts for more than 40 % of worldwide pro-
ven natural gas reserves and is expected to become the largest regional expor-
ter of LNG. It is currently evolving to a swing producer ; deliveries to
European and Asian markets and even to North America are feasible without
a significant difference in (transportation) cost.
Changes in the institutional framework demand fundamental changes in the
organizational behavior of market participants in this « second generation »
LNG market. More competition, mirrored by functioning spot markets, a gain
in contract flexibility, and increasing international trade, exposes traditional
players to greater pressure. Global mergers and acquisitions, integration, and
strategic partnerships have become routine and the industry is dominated by a
small number of large, powerful players. Several authors provide perspectives
on the emerging corporate strategies being employed, e.g., Cornot-Gandolphe
(2005) and Iniss (2004) indicate that long-term contracts are increasingly
accompanied by flexible short-term agreements (3). Shorter and/or more
flexible contracts support arbitrage trade with deliveries dedicated to the
highest value market.
Average contract duration including pipeline and LNG deliveries has shor-
tened ; whereas traditionally 25 years was common, newer agreements typi-
cally are 8 to 15 years for contracts supplying Europe via pipeline and 15 to
20 years in Asia (IEA, 2004). Importers with strong seasonality in consump-
tion (e.g., Spain, South Korea) increasingly agree on short-term deliveries up
to several months to meet seasonal variations. Our contribution to the literatu-
re is a richer analysis of the determinants of contract duration of long-term
LNG supply contracts accounting for the trade-off between the minimization
of transaction costs in terms of searching for contracting partners and (re)-
negotiating versus the mal-adaptation costs of deviations from the expected
developments of decision parameters (input or output prices, product demand,
transportation costs, etc.) as well as on the impact of transaction frequency.
The next section develops a reduced form empirical model that allows us to
test for the significance of measures of asset specificity, the need for flexibili-
ty and transaction frequency in LNG supply contracts.
(3) To secure large-scale infrastructure investments (i.e., liquefaction terminals), long-term
supply contracts concluded before the construction process today still play an important
role. However, a number of recent projects show that some companies invest without total
output capacity committed to an LTC, i.e., a share of the capacity is employed in more
flexible trade (e.g., Oman LNG; Woodside’s Pluto LNG in Australia).
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IV. — DATA AND METHODOLOGY
IV.1. Data
While most empirical work investigating LNG contracts is based on case
studies (e.g., Rigby and Catoya, 1999), we compiled a global dataset covering
long-term agreements from the beginning of the industry in the 1960s until
today from various publicly available information such as periodical reports,
newsletters, and industry journals – supporting an econometric analysis. It
includes amongst others contracting parties, annual and total contracted
volumes, year of contract signature, start date of deliveries and contract dura-
tion. Both, contracts currently in place or agreed for with the start of delivery
during the coming years and contracts that already have been terminated are
incorporated (4). We estimate that the dataset covers at least 80 % of all ever
existing long-term LNG supply contracts.
Omitting observations with implausible data and contracts with durations of
less than three years (since these have the character of short-term agreements
in the LNG industry), the sample consists of 261 LNG supply contracts, of
which 105 correspond to Atlantic Basin trade and 156 to Asia-Pacific delive-
ries. By omitting further observations where not all later defined variables
could be specified, the final sample consists of 224 observations (see
Figure 3). Contract duration of these agreements varies between three and
FIGURE 3 : Contract duration and start of deliveries
of the 224 LTCs in the sample
(4) Since our dataset includes both contracts currently in place and contracts that already have
been terminated, this study does not suffer from a truncated dependent variable as discus-
sed in several other empirical papers investigating the determinants of contract duration
(e.g., Joskow, 1987 ; Crocker and Masten, 1988).
REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE — n°127, 3ème trimestre 2009 99
30 years and is typically in the range of 15 to 30 years in the early decades of
the industry. In the past decade the number of agreements with less than
20 years and even less than ten years duration increased. Average contract
length for agreements starting delivery prior to the year 2000 is 20.3 years in
our sample ; for contracts starting delivery from 2000 on it is 16.7 years (5).
The unit of analysis for studying the determinants of contract duration is an
LNG supply contract concluded between an upstream seller (company or
consortium) and a downstream buyer. Transactions are defined as cargo deli-
veries of LNG. The endogenous variable is contract duration in years. For the
purpose of this study we assume a sample of contracts that holds constant other
contract provisions, such as price adaptation or renegotiation clauses.
Unfortunately, the existence and utilization of such provisions is held confi-
dentially by the trading partners and cannot be accounted for in this analysis.
IV.2. Explanatory variables
Asset specificity. Asset specificity varies across the transactions in the indus-
try ; in our case it refers to the degree to which an LNG import terminal is not
redeployable. The characteristic of a seller’s market accompanied by restructu-
ring and liberalization of downstream natural gas (and electricity) markets
results in downstream asset specificity. A player investing in regasification capa-
city without having secured supplies and access to midstream shipping is caught
in a lock-in situation. LNG sellers profit from significant bargaining power since
importers compete globally for supply ; furthermore, competitive downstream
markets provide easy access to numerous buyers. To quantify the level of idio-
syncrasy (i.e., relationship-specific investments) (6) we use the ratio to which
the contract exploits the nominal capacity of the import terminal (RCAPSHARE)
as a proxy. A buyer relying on a single supplier for a large volume of deliveries
will have difficulty replacing these supplies if they are terminated suddenly in
an illiquid market such as the LNG market, where only very limited free capa-
cities (upstream supplies as well as midstream ships) are available.
(5) Differentiating between importing regions, average contract duration in Continental
Europe has been 20 years (16.9 years), in the more competitive natural gas markets of
North America and the UK 20.5 years (16.1 years), and in Asia 20.3 years (16.9 years)
before and from the year 2000 on respectively based on our dataset.
(6) Transaction cost economics distinguishes between physical asset, site, dedicated, human,
intangible, and temporal specificities. However, in the LNG industry, site specificity only
matters upstream between production facilities and the liquefaction terminal, which gene-
rally are controlled under one and the same national company or consortium. We observe
dedicated assets since traditionally, investments in upstream, midstream, or downstream
capacities are safeguarded by ex ante contracting on a major portion of the nominal export
and import capacities. Physical asset specificity relates to the importance of a specific sup-
plier to an import facility. Human, intangible and temporal specificities are less relevant
for our analysis.
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Uncertainty. Uncertainty is a broad concept ; Klein (1989) distinguishes bet-
ween complexity and unpredictability ; Williamson (1985, p. 57) states that
« disturbances… are not all of a kind. Different origins are usefully distingui-
shed ». We focus on external uncertainty components measuring environmen-
tal dynamism (i.e., price uncertainty, political instability in the exporting coun-
try, and general environmental uncertainty). The unexpected occurrence of
contingencies can motivate players to behave opportunistically (e.g., in the
case of ex post maladaptation).
We employ the standard deviation of West Texas Intermediate crude oil spot
prices (STDEVOIL) in the year before contract signature, calculated based on
daily data, since oil prices traditionally influence natural gas prices via oil-lin-
kage in pricing formulas. Even though oil-linkage is substituted step by step in
preference to gas indexes that reflect gas-to-gas competition, this variable still
continues to be an adequate measure of price uncertainty. We add a second
variable for political uncertainty in the exporting country (UNC) based on
POLCON (Henisz, 2000) ; this index measures the degree of constraints on
policy change in a country averaged for five-year periods since 1960 (7). We
then add a third variable to account for a firm’s need for flexibility. Whereas
the early industry relied on inflexible, predictable, bilateral buyer-seller rela-
tionships, the industry today is characterized by major changes and a specific
unpredictability about the future : formerly regional markets become linked,
new players (i.e., countries and firms) enter the industry, liquid trading hubs
gain importance, numerous companies invest in a portfolio of export and
import positions to be able to benefit from arbitrage potentials. Empirical
research provides evidence that we can distinguish the « infant » (1960s to
1990s) from the « mature » (from 2000s on) industry (Ruester and Neumann,
2009). We use a dummy variable indicating LNG supply contracts that beca-
me operational after 1999 (D2000), expecting a negative relationship between
D2000 and CD.
Transaction frequency within the relationship. To measure the frequency of
transactions within the trading relationship (i.e., within the LNG supply
contract) we employ the annual contracted volume (VOL) assuming that
contracts are fulfilled according to their specifications. Since the standard sizes
of LNG vessels range from 130,000 to 145,000 m3, the annual contracted volu-
me provides a good indicator for the frequency of shipments within the
contract over a given period.
(7) Various studies have shown the suitability of this index for political uncertainty. We adjust
the POLCON index so that a high value expresses high uncertainty and a low value low
uncertainty ; hence our proxy variable UNC is defined as (1-POLCON). Henisz (2000)
reports POLCON indexes until the period 1990-1994. For observations after 1995 we use
the most recently reported value which is an appropriate assumption, since the index is
very stable over the reported period.
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Transaction frequency between the trading parties. Gulati and Sytch (2008)
point out that the history of prior interaction is the most important factor deter-
mining inter-organizational trust. We employ three alternative variables indi-
cating the historical trading experience between the same trading partners
assuming that repeated negotiation of LNG supply contracts reduces ex ante as
well as ex post contracting costs. Transaction costs diminish due to learning
processes ; contracting parties gain information about each other’s behavior ;
reputational aspects reduce the hazard of post-contractual opportunistic beha-
vior. First, we define a count index indicating the cumulative number of LNG
trade relationships between supplier and buyer (BILEXP1). Thus, if the parties
negotiate a contract for the first time the variable will be one ; for a second
contract between the same parties it will be two, and so on. Second, we use a
similar count index indicating the cumulative number of years of bilateral
LNG trade (BILEXP2). Third, we include a dummy variable equaling one if
the contract represents a contract renewal (RENEW) instead of the first trading
relationship between the same parties.
Control variables. We include the buyer country’s LNG share in total
imports (LNGSHARE) to account for varying supply structures. While coun-
tries like the US can import natural gas via pipeline and LNG plays only a
minor role in total gas supplies, South Korea or Japan rely heavily upon
imports. The higher the share of LNG in total imports the higher should be the
duration of supply contracts. We define a dummy variable indicating contracts
dedicated to competitive downstream markets (COMP) assuming that only the
markets in the US and the UK can be regarded as liquid and competitive. This
variable equals one if the contract became operational in periods of unbundled
transportation infrastructures (i.e., after 1992 for the US and after 1997 for the
UK), since unbundling of the monopolistic element of the value chain is an
essential precondition for non-discriminatory access to infrastructures and free
market entry.
Instrumental variables. To account for endogeneity of a right-hand side
variable (i.e., contracted volume) and conduct two-stage estimation of simul-
taneous equations we need to include instrumental variables. We use the level
of self-sufficiency of the importing country (ratio of domestic natural gas pro-
duction over total consumption, SELFSUFF), the nominal capacity of the
import terminal (CAP), and the number of import terminals in the respective
country in the year LNG deliveries under the respective contract began (TER-
MINALS). The correlation matrix (see Table 2) supports the choice of these
variables, since they weakly correlate with contract duration and more with the
annual contracted volume. For an alternative model accounting additionally
for the endogeneity of the level of relationship-specific assets we include a
dummy variable indicating value chains which operate in the Atlantic Basin
(ATLANTIC).
For a survey of all exogenous variables as well as their descriptive statistics
see Table 1, next page. More than half of the contracts of our dataset (70 %)
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started delivery from 2000 on, mirroring the expanding international LNG
trade during the last decade. The contracts account for 0.2 % of the import ter-
minal capacities (deliveries from Australia to Japanese customers) and up to
100 % (deliveries from Nigeria to Italy). The political uncertainty index of the
exporting countries ranges between zero and one with a mean of 0.59 ; the
TABLE 1 : Descriptive statistics
Characteristic Proxy Unit Denotation Exp. Mean Std. Min Max N
Sign Dev.
Propositions 1a and 1b
Specificity Ratio to which the contract % RCAPSHARE + 0.208 0.248 0.002 1 224
exploits the nominal capacity
of the import terminal
External Political instability in the UNC - 0.591 0.389 0 1 224
uncertainty supplying country
and need for
flexibility Standard deviation of WTI STDEVOIL - 3.778 2.733 0.874 12.85 224
crude oil spot price in year
before contract signature
Start-up deliveries > 1999 Dummy D2000 - 0.696 0.461 0 1 224
Propositions 2a and 2b
Within Annual contracted volume bcm/a VOL + 1.733 1.476 0.03 6.75 224
frequency
Between Cumulative number of Count BILEXP1 - 1.728 1.299 1 9 224
frequency contracts negotiated between
the two parties
Cumulative number of years Count BILEXP2 - 5.330 8.598 1 30 224
of trading relationship
between the two parties
Contract representing Dummy RENEW - 0.156 0.364 0 1 224
a contract renewal
Control variables
Dependence LNG share in total natural % LNGSHARE + 0.695 0.380 0.03 1 224
on LNG gas imports
Downstream Contract dedicated to Dummy COMP - 0.147 0.355 0 1 224
competition competitive downstream
market (i.e., US from 1992 ;
UK from 1997)
Instruments
Self-sufficiency Domestic production/total % SELFSUFF 0.219 0.375 0 1 224
consumption
Import terminal Nominal capacity of bcm/a CAP 18.908 18.906 0.21 75 224
capacity regasification terminal
Number of Number of import terminals Count TERMINALS 11.031 10.018 1 29 224
import terminals in import country
Atlantic Basin Contract destined to Atlantic Dummy ATLANTIC 0.411 0.493 0 1 224
value chain Basin customers
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standard deviation of the WTI crude oil spot price in the year before contract
signature varies strongly between 0.87 and 12.85 for recently concluded
contracts. Annual contracted volume is between 0.03 (deliveries from
Australia to Japan) and 6.75 bcm/a (planned deliveries from Iran to India). The
negotiating parties in most cases bargained for the first time ; however, bilate-
ral experience for single players shows values of up to nine (Gaz de France and
Algerian Sonatrach) and we observe previous trading experiences of up to 30
years. 16 % of the contracts in our database represent renewals of expired
agreements. The dataset involves both highly self-sufficient (e.g., US and UK)
and LNG import-dependent (e.g., Japan and South Korea) countries. In 15 %
of the observations, deliveries are dedicated to competitive downstream mar-
kets. The nominal capacity of the import facilities varies between 0.21
(Nippon’s Kagoshima terminal) and 75 bcm/a (Tepco’s import portfolio in
Japan). The number of import terminals per country in the delivery start-up
year is between one (e.g., Belgium, Greece, Turkey) and 29 (Japan as of
today).
IV.3. Methodology
To test our propositions, we define the following estimation model with
contract duration as the endogenous variable : 
CDi = φ 0 + φ 1RCAPSHAREi + φ 2UNCi + φ 3STDEVOILi + φ 4D2000
+ φ 5VOLi + φ 6BETWFREQi + φ 7LNGSHAREi + φ 8COMPi + ς i (5)
where i indexes contracts and the error term ς i is assumed to be i.i.d. We esti-
mate three models including only one of the alternative measures of the fre-
quency of transactions between the same trading partners (BETWFREQ in
Equation 5) at a time to avoid multicollinearity problems with : a)
ln(BILEXP1), b) ln(BILEXP2), and c) RENEW. Based on a first regression
analysis including BILEXP1 and BILEXP2 in linear as well as quadratic form
we found a nonlinear relationship between each of these variables and CD;
therefore we include the logged values in the estimation model.
However, contract duration and contracted volume are determined simulta-
neously when an LNG seller and buyer agree upon a supply arrangement.
Therefore, we estimate the model applying two-stage least squares (2SLS) and
verify estimation results using the generalized method of moments (GMM)
procedure (8) with :
(8) GMM is a robust estimator ; no information on the exact distribution of the disturbances
is required. In our case the estimation is based on the assumption that the error terms are
uncorrelated with the set of instrumental variables.
104 REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE — n°127, 3ème trimestre 2009
VOLi = θ0 + θ1RCAPSHAREi + θ2UNCi + θ3STDEVOILi + θ4D2000
+ θ5BETWFREQi + θ6LNGSHAREi + θ7COMPi + θ8SELFSUFFi (6)
+ θ9CAPi + θ10TERMINALSi + ξi
as the second equation in the system with ξi again assumed to be i.i.d.
V. — ESTIMATION RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION
Tables 2 and 3 present estimation results of the simultaneous equation sys-
tem. Three models (A, B, and C) are estimated including one of the above defi-
ned measures for historical transaction frequency between the same partners.
2SLS and GMM estimation lead to similar results ; for comparative reasons we
include estimation results of a simple OLS model treating the contracted volu-
me as an exogenous variable. Propositions 1a, 1b and 2b can be confirmed
empirically. The p-values of F-statistics (all < 1 %) show that the null hypo-
theses of all slope coefficients equaling zero must be rejected for all estima-
tions. Adjusted (respectively centered) R2 of 2SLS (GMM) for the equations
explaining contract duration is between 0.21 and 0.30.
The transaction cost prediction of Proposition 1a is confirmed for the
variable indicating the ratio to which the contract exploits the nominal capaci-
ty of the import terminal (RCAPSHARE). The more important the contract to
the import terminal, and therefore the higher asset specificity, the longer the
duration to mitigate ex post hold-up. Buyers relying strongly on one supplier
prefer longer-term contracts. In addition, since the level of the coefficient is
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
CD 1 1
RCAPSHARE 2 0.22 1
UNC 3 -0.04 0.16 1
STDEVOIL 4 -0.21 -0.01 0.00 1
D2000 5 -0.27 0.09 0.09 0.37 1
VOL 6 0.23 0.56 0.13 0.03 0.13 1
BILEXP1 7 -0.27 -0.26 0.07 0.11 0.01 -0.14 1
BILEXP2 8 -0.26 -0.30 0.03 0.06 -0.04 -0.09 0.84 1
RENEW 9 -0.32 -0.18 0.06 0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.66 0.78 1
LNGSHARE 10 0.12 -0.37 -0.27 -0.05 -0.18 -0.21 0.11 0.29 0.14 1
COMP 11 -0.18 0.21 0.01 0.02 0.25 0.08 -0.19 -0.23 -0.18 -0.59 1
SELFSUFF 12 -0.01 0.54 0.05 0.16 0.24 0.30 -0.26 -0.31 -0.19 -0.55 0.67 1
CAP 13 -0.07 -0.47 -0.11 0.04 -0.00 0.08 0.09 0.25 0.15 0.38 -0.24 -0.37 1
TERMINALS 14 -0.02 -0.39 -0.26 -0.06 -0.06 -0.35 0.22 0.38 0.22 0.64 -0.27 -0.45 0.21 1
ATLANTIC 15 -0.07 0.17 0.30 0.00 0.20 0.13 -0.10 -0.28 -0.13 -0.83 0.47 0.29 -0.27 -0.66 1
TABLE 2 : Correlation matrix
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one of the highest of all exogenous variables it supports the theory’s prediction
that asset specificity is the strongest determinant of transaction costs.
For Proposition 1b, we find that the coefficient of the measure of political
instability (UNC) lacks any statistical significance. This type of uncertainty
does not appear to be the relevant dimension of uncertainty for our unit of ana-
lysis and has no impact on contract duration. Joint ventures of private oil and
gas majors with national companies as well as the in many cases very high
dependence of exporting countries on revenues from oil and natural gas deli-
veries may mitigate the hazard of opportunistic behavior of upstream states.
The variable indicating price uncertainty (STDEVOIL) shows the expected
sign and is statistically significant for the 2SLS models ; hence, contract dura-
tion appears to decrease with the risk of being bound by an agreement that no
*** Statistically significant at a 1 %-level ; ** statistically significant at a 5 %-level ; * statistically significant at a 10 %-level. All
levels of statistical significance are based on two-tailed test statistics. Corrected standard errors in parentheses.
TABLE 3 : Estimation results explaining CD
Specification OLS 2SLS System GMM
(Vol as exogenous variable) (Vol as endogenous variable) (Vol as endogenous variable)
Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C
CONSTANT 18.98*** 18.67*** 18.45*** 19.59*** 19.17*** 19.05*** 19.69*** 19.29*** 18,99***
(1.60) (1.58) (1.52) (1.68) (1.66) (1.60) (1.53) (1.51) (1.54)
RCAPSHARE 3.52* 3.24* 3.29* 5,69** 5.18** 5.64** 5.64** 5.02** 5.50**
(1.85) (1.85) (1.77) (2.51) (2.54) (2.44) (2.37) (2.38) (2.30)
UNC -0.36 -0.37 -0.23 -0.29 -0.32 -0.18 -0.41 -0.50 -0.35
(0.97) (0.97) (0.94) (0.98) (0.98) (0.95) (1.00) (0.99) (0.93)
STDEVOIL -0.24* -0.25* -0.23* -0.24* -0,25* -0.24* -0.22 -0.23 -0.22
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15)
D2000 -2.67*** -2.81*** -2.70*** -2.47*** -2.63*** -2.49*** -2.45*** -2.63*** -2.42***
(0.86) (0.86) (0.83) (0.89) (0.88) (0.86) (0.75) (0.74) (0.74)
VOL 0.72** 0.80*** 0.92*** 0.05 0.22 0.22 0.08 0.28 0.28
(0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.59) (0.59) (0.57) (0.57) (0.56) (0.56)
In(BILEXP1) -2.77*** -2.77*** -2.83***
(0.70) (0.71) (0.68)
In(BILEXP2) -1.23*** -1.19*** -1.23***
(0.29) (0.30) (0.29)
RENEW -5.63*** -5.63*** -5.53***
(0.97) (1.01) (0.85)
LNGSHARE 1.76 2.41* 1.83 1.68 2.32* 1.73 1.57 2.19* 1.70
(1.27) (1.28) (1.23) (1.29) (1.30) (1.25) (1.15) (1.14) (1.18)
COMP -2.70** -2.35* -2.85** -2.93** -2.54* -3.05** -3.14** -2.75** -3.20**
(1.30) (1.29) (1.25) (1.33) (1.31) (1.28) (1.37) (1.36) (1.41)
Adjusted R2 0.234 0.239 0.288 0.214 0.225 0.267
Centered R2 0.243 0.255 0.296
N 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224
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longer reflects the actual price level, which determines the profitability of the
capital-intensive LNG value chain.
As expected, the variable controlling for the need for flexibility as measured
by the start-up date of the contract (D2000) indicates that contract duration
decreases over time. Whereas in the first generation LNG market inflexible
bilateral long-term supply agreements typically lasted 20 to 30 years, the
second generation market is characterized by a considerable expansion of
capacities, changing trading conditions due to restructuring processes in
downstream markets favoring competition, and trading places gaining in liqui-
dity. Market liquidity promotes the use of flexible trades that help parties bene-
fit from arbitrage potentials in the global market.
Proposition 2a refers to the impact of transaction frequency within the rela-
tionship. We found no statistical significance of the coefficient of the annual
contracted volume (VOL) indicating the number of transactions (i.e., cargo
deliveries) within the trading relationship for the models accounting for the
endogeneity of this variable (9). An alternative estimation testing for a non-
linear impact of the contracted volume does not change the result. Real-world
LNG contracts contain numerous clauses that specify potential adaptations to
changing environmental conditions. Because most agreements are confiden-
tial, we are unable to account for the impact of provisions such as pricing
clauses that would be highly valuable for research purposes.
Our empirical results provide broad support for Proposition 2b ; the estima-
tion coefficients of all three variables (ln(BILEXP1), ln(BILEXP2), and
RENEW) have the expected negative signs and are highly statistically signifi-
cant. We can confirm that LNG supply contracts decrease in duration as bilate-
ral trading experience between the contracting parties (i.e., historical transaction
frequency between the trading partners) increases. This can be explained by a
decrease in contracting costs ; LNG supplier and buyer gain information about
each other’s characteristics with every negotiation process, reputational effects
may diminish the hazard of opportunistic behavior, and the partners benefit from
a body of informal institutions that evolve over repeated bargaining.
The statistically significant control variables also provide interesting fin-
dings. As previously noted countries with a greater dependence on imports in
the form of LNG (LNGSHARE) tend to negotiate longer-term agreements and
forgo some flexibility in favor of supply security. Even in the present econo-
mic downturn we expect that new importers with demand growth well above
average like China and India will further tighten global supply. Committing to
one supplier decreases the risk that the supplier may seek another destination
market with more attractive provisions when a shorter-term contract ends.
(9) This shows that ignoring the endogeneity of right-hand-side variables can produce mis-
leading estimation results.
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Furthermore, we find that deliveries to competitive downstream markets
(COMP) are realized via shorter-term agreements, confirming previous fin-
dings of Hirschhausen and Neumann (2008) who analyze a dataset including
pipeline as well as LNG contracts. Competition favors diversification of sup-
pliers, supply sources, and supply routes and hence is conducive to supply
security ; long-term contracts lose in importance.
Table 3 shows the estimation results of the first-stage regression
(Equation 6) which explains annual contracted volume adding a set of instru-
mental variables. For econometric reasons all system exogenous variables
must be included in this regression. The level of self-sufficiency (SELFSUFF)
in natural gas supply of the importing country has no major impact on the
contracted volume. The higher the nominal import terminal capacity (CAP)
the higher will be the contracted volume. There is a negative relationship bet-
TABLE 4 : Estimation results 1st stage explaining VOL
Specification 2SLS System GMM
Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C
CONSTANT 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38
(0.33) (0.33) (0.32) (0.31) (0.31) (0.30)
RCAPSHARE 4.04*** 4.05*** 4.04*** 4.04*** 4.05*** 4.04***
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41)
UNC 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.02
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
STDEVOIL -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
D2000 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.24
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18)
ln(BILEXP1) 0.11 0.11
(0.15) (0.13)
ln(BILEXP2) 0.08 0.08
(0.06) (0.06)
RENEW 0.46** 0.46
(0.21) (0.22)
LNGSHARE -0.09 -0.10 -0.04 -0.09 -0.10 -0.04
(0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34)
COMP -0.29 -0.29 -0.23 -0.29 -0.29 -0.23
(0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30)
SELFSUFF 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.21
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.31) (0.31) (0.32)
CAP 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
TERMINALS -0.02** -0.03** -0.03** -0.02** -0.03** -0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.466 0.469 0.477
Centered R2 0.490 0.493 0.500
N 224 224 224 224 224 224
*** Statistically significant at a 1 %-level ; ** statistically significant at a 5 %-level ; * statistically significant at a 10 %-
level. All levels of statistical significance are based on two-tailed test statistics. Corrected standard errors in parentheses.
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ween the number of import facilities (TERMINALS) in the buying country
and the annual contracted volume. This result, for example, reflects the situa-
tion in Japan, where numerous (also small scale) terminals near all major
demand centers substitute for the nonexistent gas transmission network, whe-
reas countries such as Belgium receive all deliveries via a single import faci-
lity.
However, theory argues that the level of specific investments is itself a deci-
sion variable (Masten, 1995). Therefore, we run an additional regression
model explaining in a first step the variable indicating relationship-specific
investments in the LNG industry (RCAPSHARE) by the set of all exogenous
variables and an additional instrument (ATLANTIC). The predicted values of
asset specificity are included into the 2SLS model. Estimation results are lis-
ted in Table 5 and reconfirm the above findings. Only the coefficient of the
level of specific investments (RCAPSHARE_hat) loses in statistical signifi-
cance.
VI. — SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides an empirical assessment of LNG supply contracts in
order to determine optimal contract duration. We derive testable hypotheses
from theoretical approaches on contracting and discuss the trade-off between
contracting costs due to repeated bilateral bargaining versus the need for flexi-
bility in uncertain environments. Estimation results of a model of simultaneous
equations show that the presence of high, dedicated asset specificity in LNG
contracts results in longer contract duration, which confirms the predictions of
transaction cost economics. We observe, however, that the increasing need for
flexibility in today’s second generation LNG industry reduces contract dura-
tion, as does the presence of a high price uncertainty. Firms experienced in
bilateral trading generally are able to negotiate shorter contracts. We also find
that countries that rely heavily on LNG imports are often willing to forgo some
flexibility in favor of supply security whereas deliveries to competitive downs-
tream markets take place under shorter-term agreements.
We could not fully confirm the theoretically discussed trade-off because not
all uncertainty variables produce significant results. Numerous empirical stu-
dies investigating the effect of environmental uncertainty on governance choi-
ce present non-significant and even ambiguous results (e.g., Crocker and
Masten, 1988 ; Klein et al., 1990, Heide and John, 1990). However, as Klein
(1989, p. 256) states : « It appears that uncertainty is too broad a concept and
that different facets of it lead to both a desire for flexibility and a motivation
to reduce transaction costs ». Klein argues further that the effect depends on
the dimension of uncertainty ; the author shows that whereas unpredictability
should have a negative impact on vertical control, complexity should be posi-
tively related to more hierarchical governance structures. We suggest that
empirical studies should split external uncertainty into its components, inves-
tigate the opposing effects and determine which dimensions of uncertainty are
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relevant for the respective transaction. Furthermore, contractual provisions
(such as price adaptation clauses) – which unfortunately are confidential and
cannot be incorporated in our analysis – are an important measure to react to
changing environmental conditions and to decrease the inflexibility of long-
term agreements. We note that motivations other than efficiency (e.g., strate-
TABLE 5 : Estimation results RCAPSHARE engodenized using 2SLS (10)
Specification 1st stage 2nd stage
(Dep. var. : VOL) (Dep. var. : CD)
Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C
CONSTANT 0.59 0.61 0.57 19.97*** 19.52*** 19.33***
(0.80) (0.78) (0.79) (2.05) (1.98) (1.89)
RCAPSHARE_hat 3.29 3.20 3.33 4.81 4.25 4.88*
(2.53) (2.51) (2.60) (3.02) (3.04) (2.88)
UNC 0.09 0.08 0.05 -0.23 -0.27 -0.15
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (1.02) (1.01) (0.98)
STDEVOIL -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.24 -0.25* -0.24*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
D2000 0.25 0.27 0.26 -2.44*** -2.62*** -2.48***
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.92) (0.90) (0.88)
ln(BILEXP1) 0.07 -2.89***
(0.23) (0.78)
ln(BILEXP2) 0.06 -1.24***
(0.09) (0.32)
RENEW 0.44 -5.40***
(0.27) (1.04)
LNGSHARE -0.11 -0.11 -0.05 1.48 2.14 1.56
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (1.43) (1.41) (1.37)
COMP -0.45 -0.47 -0.38 -2.96** -2.56* -3.06**
(0.65) (0.64) (0.66) (1.37) (1.34) (1.31)
SELFSUFF 0.50 0.54 0.47
(0.97) (0.99) (1.03)
CAP 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
TERMINALS -0.03* -0.03* -0.03*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.457 0.211 0.218 0.176 0.195 0.232
N 224 224 224 224 224 224
*** Statistically significant at a 1 %-level ; ** statistically significant at a 5 %-level ; * statistically significant at a 10 %-
level. All levels of statistical significance are based on two-tailed test statistics. Corrected standard errors in parentheses.
(10) Estimation results of the model explaining RCAPSHARE using the set of exogenous
variables as well as the additional instrument ATLANTIC is available from the author
upon request. Using the method of GMM, we could verify the above presented results.
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gic reasons, the establishment of a portfolio of activities, or market foreclosu-
re) can also drive company behavior.
Our empirical study can only confirm one of the two complementary pre-
dictions of transaction frequency’s impact on vertical control. We note the
importance of distinguishing between a « within » perspective (i.e., transaction
cost economics view) and a « between » perspective (i.e., organizational lear-
ning and reputational effects view).
Future empirical work should address several issues. First, alternative theo-
ries should be explored to explain company behavior and the choice and struc-
ture of governance modes. Aggarwal (2007, p. 485) stresses that « while …
different theories have emphasized different factors, it is plausible that in many
situations these factors supplement each other rather than being exclusive ».
Second, researchers need to identify better proxies of theoretical constructs
(transaction costs, asset specificity, uncertainty, etc.) that will improve empiri-
cal testing. Third, the historical frequency of transactions between the same
partners should also be treated as a decision variable. Finally, although empi-
rical studies should account for simultaneous choice of contract provisions like
contract duration or the level of completeness of contracts, we acknowledge
the challenges due to very limited data availability.
The structure of international LNG trade is changing both in quantity and
quality : natural gas hubs gain liquidity, long-term contracts and short-term
agreements co-exist, and the duration of shipping charter contracts is falling
significantly. However, LTCs are still the optimal means to secure the amorti-
zation of infrastructure investments. No upstream greenfield project has beco-
me operational without a significant share of the capacity dedicated to long-
term agreements. Nevertheless, a growing share of capacities, especially of
expansion projects, is dedicated to seasonal and short-term contracts. Contract
renewals often result in shorter contracts with a lower volume than the initial
agreements (e.g., contracts between Australian NWS LNG and Japanese cus-
tomers renewed in 2006).
If the first generation of LNG market companies tended to develop bilateral
trading relationships within one of the major regions (North America, Europe-
Eurasia-North Africa, or Asia-Pacific), today’s market motivates entry along
the entire value chain. This allows players to invest in varying export and
import positions, as well as in flexible transport capacities that enable arbitra-
ge trades and the realization of swap agreements (11). This new type of flexi-
(11) As reported by World Gas Intelligence, Électricité de France recently signed a swap agree-
ment with the US-based Dow exchanging one cargo slot per month at either Zeebrugge
(Belgium) or Montoir (France) for one slot at the Freeport LNG receiving terminal
(Texas). This second trans-Atlantic swap agreement in 2008 follows Suez and
ConocoPhillips (also involving the Freeport and Zeebrugge terminals).
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bility holds the key to ensure supply security ; for one of the first discussions
of LNG arbitrage see Zhuravleva (2009). This has important implications for
governmental policies concerning energy security. For example, policy-
makers need to determine whether exceptions to the general rule of competi-
tion should be applied both upstream (liquefaction, e.g., ensuring a diversified
contract portfolio) and downstream (regasification, e.g., ensuring open
access).
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